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The Enigma Machine: German Warfare and Technology in the Second World War

Breaking the Advanced System


According to Adolf Hitler, "Demoralize the enemy from within by surprise, terror, sabotage, assassination. This is the war of the future." As a historical figure, perhaps no other single individual of the Twentieth Century captures more fascination and disdain than Hitler and his Nazis. Through revolutionizing modern warfare, Nazi Germany was near successful in accomplishing the sinister dimensions of Hitler's master plan. As part of Germany's military techniques of the era, the enigma machine was a critical innovation that aided German's forces in sending coded messages to one another. Essentially, an Enigma machine can be defined as an related electro mechanical rotor cipher machine used for the encryption and decryption of secret messages invented by German engineer Arthur Scherbius at the end of the First World War. By 1932, the Polish Cipher Bureau was able to crack the German military Enigma codes and this information was shared with French and British military intelligence. While this information was extremely useful to the war effort, it did not receive wide spread attention until after much damage was already done using this covert method of communication. As a result, the Allies were considerably behind the German use of the technology even when they were making progress and breaking codes. To demonstrate the efficacy of the machine, historians recently demonstrated how General Franco's use of Enigma machines significantly aided in his victory during the Spanish Civil War. Essentially, Enigma machines made it possible for leaders to organize men across miles of terrain without messages being intercepted by the enemy.

Enigma Technology

The fact that Enigma technology was available before the Second World War but did not receive widespread attention played a critical role German's initial success with its blitzkrieg warfare methodology. Had the technology been used by the Allies prior to this, it could be argued that the early course of the war could have been radically altered. The degree to which this may or may not have occurred is most closely linked to the confined of what if history. As a result, it can be stated that it would be futile to make an definitive declarations regarding to the degree to which the technology helped Germany. Historically, however, it can be concluded that the Enigma machine was a valuable tool to the Nazis just as it was to Franco during the Spanish Civil War. The proposed research study will examine the Enigma machine and its history, what attempts were made to crack and the impact it would have had if the Allies had a greater understanding of the technology prior to the Second World War. It is hypothesized by the researcher that significant data is available that would suggest a very different looking military efficacy pattern at the onset of the war for Germany had the Enigma machine received more attention by the Allies prior to the conflict. In addition, understanding why the Allies did not awaken to and use Enigma technology is pivotal for understand the psyche of the warring faction at the time.

In an effort to accomplish the proposed study, this work will draw from historical documents, peer reviewed research, periodicals and other reputable historical interpretations for data. The data collected for the study will then be analyzed and examined for patterns and relationships that pertain to the topic. Based on an initial search of the subject and the nature of World War II itself, it was concluded by the researcher that a great deal of material on the subject is currently available. As a result, the subject will not be a difficult one in which to find suitable research. What will be necessary, however, is examining the validity of the selected research to make sure that only the most reputable ones are employed. Though the degree of research available on the subject is a strength, the fact that attention to the machine did not occur until later by the Allies makes suggestions otherwise speculation. As a result, the study can only present an educated guess on the matter that cannot necessarily be substantiated definitely because history simply did not occur that way. This exercise in critical thinking is useful for providing a greater understanding of the era and the technology that was employed as part of the respective historical pattern.

Understanding Enigma Technology

According to Webster's Intermediate Dictionary, the word enigma is defined as "Something hard to understand or explain." As a result, the terminology is quite fitting for understanding Enigma technology and its attributes. Holistically, the Enigma machine was a highly advanced electro-mechanical cipher machine that was developed by Germany sometime after the conclusion of the First World War. During the Second World War, this device was the main element of secure wireless communication for Germany until the end of the conflict. It is important to note that the Enigma machine is not a singular machine, but a classification of machine that includes several different models and devices based on similar technology. As a result, it can be stated that an Enigma machine is type of instrument based on a singular type of technology. The technology, however, while innately the same, could be manipulated to make more complex and more difficult codes to break. As a result, throughout World War II, the types of Enigma machines used evolved and with them, so did their efficacy. To a layperson, an Enigma machine has an appearance like a typewriter. While this appearance trait is true, that is essentially the only thing in which the two devices have in common. An Enigma machine is quite complex with 17,576 settings for each of the 60 possible wheel orders for just setting up the machine to use.

The machine was used for two specific activities, to encipher and to decipher messages. The machine did not send messages and its most rudimentary of forms, it did not type out messages either. For those who used the device, it consisted of a keyboard of 26 letters in the standard pattern of a German typewriter without the keys for numerals or punctuation. Behind the keyboard was 26 circular windows that each had QWERTZU patterns that would light up from bulbs placed underneath. Those models that are often featured with A-Z keyboards were actually Polish-French replicas and not actual examples of German enigma machines. The central three selection wheels were chosen from a box of five and monthly orders gave specific notations for new choices each day. This pattern fluctuation capability made the Enigma machine something that was constantly adapting. "Breaking the code," therefore, was only part of the battle for understanding Engima message. Not only was it necessary to understand the way in which the machine worked, it was also necessary to know how the German forces were using it at a particular time, which was ever changing. As a result, simply having an Enigma machine with a rudimentary understanding of how they operated would not be enough to decipher an intercepted message.

At the beginning of the month and sometimes daily thereafter the trained Enigma operators would be given a Key, which became the first three steps in every enciphering procedure. The first step was the wheel order, it gave the specific choice and position of the three wheels to be utilized. This was then followed by the ring setting, which outlined whether or not the left, middle and right position would be selected. The third instruction would be the cross-plugging, which was known as the "steckering" portion of the process. This process was typical of German operation until after April of 1940 when the process evolved into something more complex thereby adding 4 additional steps that included: turning wheels to a position chosen at random, twice keying three wheels to a position chosen at random, twice keying his own randomly selected choice of text setting, coming out at the indicator and then setting the wheels at BGZ and keyed the full text of the message thus allowing for the enciphered text to be done letter by letter. According to Enigma machine historian Alan Strip, the message transmitted included the following four elements:

While this brief explanation of Enigma technology is sufficiently robust to illustrate a basic understanding of the machines and their use, it is by no means considered to be a comprehensive overview of how they operated. It does, however, outline a sufficient blueprint for putting the technology into the proper context for further exploration of its use in combat. This framing is important for understanding the strengths and weaknesses of the Allied response to its usage.

Weaknesses of the Enigma

The fundamental weakness of the Enigma machine was not a design flaw but in its reliance on human beings to operate. The entire Allied deciphering of the Enigma codes can be attributed to human error and/or human carelessness. These situations, that will be discussed later in the work, gave the type of windows necessary for patterns and the likes to be exploited for greater understanding. According to historian David Kahn, there were some cryptographic weaknesses present in the Enigma machine so it was not infallible, however, it was procedural mistakes, operator mistakes and captured key pad hardware from which the major code breaks originated. For the scope and focus of this particular work, the extent of the cryptographic weaknesses does not necessitate articulation. Instead, it is sufficient to understand that the machine was solid mechanically and in function with limited built in weaknesses. Those weaknesses were essentially eclipsed by the other human derived error that led to the breaks that led to pattern spotting.

Breaking the Code

According to Sarah Spence Adams, "The Allies broke this impenetrable cipher through relentless analysis, the use of cribs, the exploitation of repeated messages, the building of machines to break the cipher, and the occasional monumental aids such as captured cryptographical machines and related instructions." Despite related discourse to how well the Allies used the information and to what extent their pursuit of the technology was appropriate, it remains a historical fact that during the War effort, Allies gained the ability to get the salient characteristics of messages sent and received by Germans when sufficient time was allocated to the effort. This was true of the original Enigma technology and the random use that came later. In each of those transitions, however, the Allies went through periods in which they were ill equipped to keep up with the changes. For example, the initial use of the Enigma technology resulted in them needing to catch up and upon catching up, the switch to the randomized methods again necessitated that the intelligence officers of the Allies learn the new system. Both, as mentioned, were accomplished.

In general, however, the Second World War "brought a shift from handwritten cryptography to machines capable of spinning up complex, ever-changing codes." As with new technology development, there are typically leaders, innovators and followers that result in various levels of evolution between interested parties. The Enigma machine is one of the most famed examples of this transition and it was first employed by the German Navy in 1926 thereby making it a technology that was well understood by the Germans prior to the onset of the Second World War. In addition to focus on machines, Germany also recruited mathematicians for studying codes and ciphers based on their ability to find patterns. According to Chris Christenson, "Every language has rules so that the language 'makes sense.' These rules create patterns in messages that can be exploited by cryptanalysts." During its time, the degree to which it would be successful, to which it would become common place and the political climate going on in Germany at the time were all unknown variables. For the Allies to miss focusing on a such a technology in its formidable phases was an oversight; yet, it was clearly an understandable one.

Officially, it was the Polish Cipher Bureau who first broke the Enigma code in 1932. This information was later shared with the rest of the Allies shortly before the onset of the war. According to Gordon Welchman, the eventual head of Hut 6, "Hut 6 Ultra would have never gotten off the ground if we had not learned from the Poles, in the nick of time, the details both of the German military version of the commercial Enigma machine, and of the operating procedures that were in use." As demonstrated in the previous weakness section, this particular first hand historical account focuses on the importance of identifying operating procedures in the code breaking process. The process of mastering the Enigma technology, however, was not a single event as it had an evolutionary period to gain greater insight to its intricacies. Adams explained one portion of this evolution, "In the midst of the war, Alan Turing (the "father of the modern computer") deduced that the Germans transmitted a daily weather report near 6 a.m., and that 'wetter' appeared in the same place each message."

This was an example of the pattern being caught by the Allies and used to their advantage. The primary facilitators of the code breaking practices of the era after the initial sharing of information by the Polish was the British intelligence program that went under the name Ultra. Though a British program, it was sustained with the help and cooperation of other members of the Allies. It was a combination of shared information, cryptologists, mathematicians and individuals engaged in espionage that facilitated the evolution of code patterns and machines used by the Germans. Ultra, though instrumental in the Enigma decryption process, was not only used for Enigma decoding as it was also used to help break codes from Germany's Lorenz SZ 40 and 42 machines, Italian ciphers and Japanese ciphers. From this statement it is also necessary to identify that though the Enigma machine was the primary code machine for the Germans, it was not the only one that was employed during the Second World War. The Lorenz SZ machines were primarily employed by German High Command.

When the Germans made the switch to the randomized process of Enigma transmission that undermined much of the gains that had been made by the Allies prior in their understanding of the less sophisticated process, it was an error by a U-Boat that gave the Allies a chance to again demonstrate the ability to understand messages in a timely manner, though not without great effort. After the randomized switch, a U-Boat transmitted a message once using the old system and then again shortly thereafter using the new system. With intelligence officials catching this mistake, the Allies were able to spot the necessary patterns that set the foundations for them to understand the random transmission variable that had previously put Germany in an advantageous position in regards to secret message transmission. Had this mistake not been made by the German war machine, it is unknown how long it would have taken for another mistake to have been made that the Allies could have capitalized on. While it is unlikely this singular mistake would have changed the outcome of the war, it did significantly change the way in which the Allies could break codes after the randomized switch for ciphering using the Enigma machine replaced the older methodology.

In addition to the evolving code structures that accompanied the development of the Enigma use by the Germans, there was also military branch variation. The Naval Enigma signals used different ciphers for example than their air force and army counterparts. The primary cipher for the naval Enigma technology was Heimische Gewasser who was known to Bletchley Park as Dolphin. It was used for surface ships and U-Boats that were operating in their home waters. This was one of 14 Ciphers that were used by the German Navy throughout the War for various applications. For Hut 8, the Dolphin traffic signals could not be understood without significant delay until June and July of 1941. As a result, there was a significant delay in Allied mastery of this particular code during the beginning phases of the war. Even though the Enigma code was broken applying those elements into how the German's were using the technology in practice was another challenge. The Dolphin use of the Enigma machine was finally understood when weather ships in Munchen and Lauenburg were captured thus allowing Hut 4 to translate the decrypts. Once this code was decrypted, it was sent to London and this allowed for Allies to reroute many of their supply convoys past the handful of U-boats that were in the North Atlantic. In addition to human capital, it has been estimated by researchers that hundreds and thousands of tons of vital shipping materials were saved as a result of this particular breakthrough. This action alone can be said to have significantly allowed the Allies to gain an advantage that could have expedited the demise of the Axis powers.

After this particular breakthrough, from 1941 onwards, the Enigma change that navally occurred every two days was mastered by the Allies to the extent that communiques could be deciphered in about 20 minutes. While this is a naval example of using the Enigma crack in practice, it does demonstrate how knowledge of the machine combined with human mistakes were necessary to use the intelligence correctly. It would be erroneous to suggest that the breakthrough made by the Polish was the end of the Enigma usefulness as it really was only the beginning of the process for understanding the technology. When the Poles shared their knowledge with the Allies and the Allies began their observation of German use and studying of the material that the actual process of counter intelligence operation began. The true cracking of the Enigma machine, on a practical level as it related to German war use, began on the day the technology was shared with the Allies.

According to cryptologist and author, David Kahn, "The Allies only broke Enigma transmissions by taking educated guesses at the solution, then using Bombes to generate possible settings that yielded the encrypted text. Without an educated guess as to the content, he says, there are too many combinations of wheel settings to break Enigma in a human lifetime." Again reverting back to the weaknesses of the Enigma machine, the Allies were successful not because they mastered the Enigma technology, but through their capitalization on human error and the human fallibility of the machine. The machine itself is a solid mechanism for coding and itself a strong method for making secret coded messages. This factor made the German employment of the machine a wise choice and it put the Allies in a position where they had to look for those human related designations that could allow them to make sense of what was being transmitted.

Analysis of the Intelligence Use

More so than perhaps any other war in the Twenty First Century, the mission of the Allied powers was quite popular in their respective states. In the U.S., for example, it can be argued that it was the most popular war ever fought with a greater portion of the population actively participating in the war. There 18 million serving in the armed forces, 10 million serving overseas and 25 million workers regularly giving their pay to war bonds putting: capitalists, communists, Democrats, Republicans, poor, rich and middle class all unified in their perspectives. This was due to the ideological scope behind the struggle as "it was a war against an enemy of unspeakable evil. Hitler's Germany was extending totalitarianism, racism, militarism and overt aggressive warfare beyond what an already cynical world had experienced." Whether or not these assumptions were accurate or inaccurate are irrelevant as they were part of the psyche and perception present in the world during this complicated and widely studied time period. The using of available intelligence regarding the Enigma machine and other variables was based on many considerations including but not limited to: perceived usefulness, political context, understanding of its implications and available resources. Delays in acting on intelligence were not based on ignoring the potential threat of Germany in the time period directly before the war.

The degree to which the breaking of the Engima technology changed the outcome of the war is not universally agreed upon by historians. As a result, accessing as to what would have happened had the Allies not been behind most of the German message technology is also difficult to say with any definitive perspective. One of the more profound first hand perspectives on the importance of cracking the Enigma code was the words of Winston Churchill to King George VI when he stated, "It was thanks to ULTRA that we won the war." For proponents of Churchill's assessment, it is a frequently cited designation that the solving of the Enigma riddle expedited the demise of Germany by as much as 2 years. The important consideration that underlies these statistics is that the Allies did not ignore the Enigma technology. Though it can be argued about degrees of influence, it is generally accepted that breaking the Enigma code aided the Allied war effort significantly. Allies, however, were consistently chasing German cryptology from the beginning of the War until the end. During the time period between the First and Second World War, the Allies had the same amount of time and resources that they could have devoted to pursing such technologies. Germany, however, did so on a much more efficacious level. Therefore, the preemptive efforts of the Allies to stay ahead of potential foes was lacking and so was the use of available intelligence. Quite simply, they underestimated the importance of the Enigma machine.

When the Enigma machine is referenced in common Allied-Centric historical accounts typically consumed in popular media outlets, the actual story is more complicated and demonstrates Allied fallibility rather than foresight. Typically, the Enigma machine story heralds the code breakers and the ULTRA program as being heroes and central to the demise of Germany. While this is not necessary a wrong proclamation, resource allocation at early points in the War and pre-War efforts could have made this process much easier. In addition, there are still parts of the Enigma codes that have not even been solved even by modern cryptographers.

Professionals and some enthusiasts still actively study Enigma codes that essentially still are very much an enigma making it true to its name. As was demonstrated in the Enigma machine weakness portion of this historical analysis, there was a profound reliance on mistakes and user errors to break codes. It was not mastery of the Enigma technology that made the Allies successful but their reliance on the fact that human beings would make errors that they could exploit. Rather than a scientific advancement of superiority, this was a practical reactionary response to German methodology. The catch up process of the Allies to the code systems of the germans was conducted in cycles. At one point, after the code breaking systems and intelligence information gained symmetry and political/strategic favorability, the Allies achieved homeostasis that put them at the top of intelligence game. Germany, however, quickly adapted and again put the Allies significantly behind in this area. According to Mathematical historian, Sarah Spence Adams, "The Allies were at the top of the intelligence game until December 1941, when the Germans made a change in the scrambling unit of Enigma."

Part of the Allied problems related to developing their own cryptography encoding and deciphering systems can be attributed to the political synergy between the Allied parties. Though working for the same goal, there was cultural, political and language related barriers that made the sharing of information, particularly related to intelligence, less efficacious than it could have been. British cryptologist of the era, Harry Hinsley, explained this phenomenon with particular reference to working with the French during a "deteriorating political situation" when he proclaimed that had this climate not existed, shared achievements amongst the Allies would have been more common. As a result, the suggestion that there was an unrestricted free flow of information and good will between all of the Allies is a grotesque oversimplification of political history during that time period. In addition, the Allies as a collective organization were not given a great deal of time to learn the full dynamics of the Enigma machine in order to put code cracking attributes into the warfare logistical schematic. In 1932, the Polish Cipher Bureau had the information on how to break the Enigma codes. They only shared this information, however, five weeks before the outbreak of the war in 1939. Learning and mastering such a technology that the German's had been employing for some time was not something that would be easy to accomplish in a five week period. Though the Polish intelligence had cracked the code, the information was not widely available and it was not immediately acted upon with full gusto by the Allies as a collective unit upon receiving the information. These two attributes demonstrate a slow information transfer and response by two key Allied players at the onset of the war. As outlined by these examples, the political strain between the Allies limited the code breaking process despite the eventual positive outcome.

It is also important to designate that having related intelligence based on cracking Enigma codes is only on portion of the equation. When the data is not used correctly, having even the best intelligence is a moot point in combat. At the height of the Allied enigma code system code breaking, the Allies could generally decipher a message in one to two days. The Germans made it a habit of openly discussing plans and movements when they were aware the Allies could crack the messages with suitable time. This, however, led to information overload and the Allies had to respond to masses of information with mixed results. It was not that Germany was unaware of the Allied capability, it was that they felt the Allies would not be able to properly use the information. One well publicized example of this was Rommel's work at Kasserine Pass. In this situation, the Americans were well aware of what was likely to happen based on Enigma code breaking generated data, however, they did not properly use the information they had thereby negating benefit of gathering sound intelligence. Based on reports of German insiders at the conclusion of the War, Germany was not surprised the codes were broken, however, they were surprised about the amount of time and resources that the Allies spent in trying to break them.

Not keeping up with code encryption by the Allies in itself was a misuse of available intelligence. The importance of signals in intelligence was evident during World War I. World War I, or the Great War, marked the first global conflict using modern military technology. The entire war can be considered a lesson in how conflict would be conducted in the Twentieth Century. Many of the warfare styles that characterized pre-modern strategies were not longer equipped for the modern conflict paradigm. As a result, there was a great deal of trial and error present in that particular conflict that led to the realization of how horrific and total modern warfare could be. The British, during the naval battles of the Great War, worked tirelessly at intercepting German communications and became quite proficient at it. At the conclusion of the war, during the rebuilding process, it became clear to Germans that their communications had been compromised and that future military efforts would necessitate new ways of sending messages within the landscape of modern warfare.

After the Treaty of Versailles, that occurred in 1919, the German defense establishment was cognizant of their current shortcomings and saw the potential in the commercial Enigma technology as their possible savior for the existing problem. The Enigma machine that was developed by Dr. Arthur Scherbius was not created with the intention of military use; instead, it was targeting businesses who wished to transmit secure communications. It was the German Navy who first embraced the technology followed by the Army and then the Air Force of the country. As a result, the Enigma technology was not a top secret component who's secrets were obscured by the world. Had Allies seen similar potential in the device or even considered that Germany could be looking for such technology, they could have anticipated such a move and embraced the technology themselves. Even if they did not embrace the technology to employ it, they could have gained a better understanding of the product that would have helped them to decipher codes sent by it during the Second World War.

While saying that the Allies missed the opportunity and denouncing it as a grave error maybe true to an extent, however, the concept of signaling was not a focal point in Europe at the conclusion of the war. At the conclusion of the First World War, Europe was rebuilding. Each country had its own unique problems and was seeking to reestablish themselves as powers in the aftermath of the previous conflict. For many of these nations, the resources and the attention to what was considered by many to be an inconsequential detail of future combat was an understandable oversight. Though understandable, however, it was still an oversight that allowed Germany to gain an advantage in the secure communications paradigm of modern warfare. Part of this phenomenon can be attributed to a general underestimation of Germany's ability to rebuild and the intent of the Nazi Party. At the conclusion of the First World War, Germany was a conquered nation and the entire state was in disarray. The Allies, who were enraged about the entire conflict, enacted harsh reparations and created a League of Nations to enforce the standards outlined at the conclusion of the conflict.

Without the presence of the United States, the weakened European states were not in a position to be able to enforce much of the imposed restrictions enacted at the conclusion of the Great War. While the Allies victory in the First World War provided some foundation for the underestimation of Germany, there were other notable considerations. By September of 1939, Great Britain, France and Poland were superior in industrial resources, population and military manpower to their German counterparts. Germany, however, had strong armament, training, doctrine, discipline and fighting spirit that made them the most efficient and effective fighting force of its size in the world at its time. The same spirit and discipline was present in all ranks of the military machine and this included communications. The underestimation of Germany on all levels, therefore, was part of the original Allied perspective and therefore necessitates consideration when exploring why the Allies did not embrace the Enigma technology components sooner than they did.


The Enigma machine occupies an important role in the history of code encryption as well as in the history of the Second World War. Transmitting and receiving messages without giving away those messages to the enemy has long been a focus of human beings when competing. The ability to send information in a manner that no one else can understand over great distances can provide the necessary strategic advantage to sway the outcome of a given conflict. Codes and message transmissions are as important in the Twenty First Century as they were during the Second World War. For the Second World War, however, the Enigma machine is nearly synonymous with encryption to the extent that it has reached near mythical proportions in popular media and examinations of the modern global conflict. Some of this can be attributed to its complexity and the mystery that still surrounds a full understanding of Germany's use of the device. Beyond this, however, is its linked to Adlolf Hitler's Third Reich. Examining the salient characteristics of Hitler's master plan is a horrific process that turns even the most casual observer to the inevitable question of what the world would look like had the Nazis been successful in the conflict.

The natural inquisitiveness that follows this thought pattern leads to the type of warfare analysis that examines why Germany lost the war and why the Allies were successful since an Allied victory was not imminent. The deciphering of the Enigma codes may have hastened the demise of the Germans but alone it cannot be attributed in good conscience to why Germany lost the war. It did play an important role in strategic advantages for both groups and it did play a role that cannot be overlooked in any complete analysis of how the war was fought. The research question as to why the Allies did not awaken to and use the Enigma technology before they did is not an easy question to answer as the research has indicated. In the first component of this equation, it is necessary to understand that the Allies did use Enigma technology and they did crack much of the Enigma ciphers in both of their forms during the course of the war thus enabling them to gain some advantage over the Germans. While this is true, the Allies were behind the Germans in cryptography and were not as efficacious as they could have been in neutralizing the technology has some important elements been attended to.

Germany was using Enigma code technology quite early and this made them world leaders in the field. The Polish, however, were able several years before the onset of World War II to break German's codes. The Polish did not pass this information on to other European powers that would later become the Allied forces until only a few weeks before the beginning of the war. The Allied familiarity with the technology, therefore, occurred much later thereby putting them in a position of playing "catch up" to the Germans. In addition, matters of political consequence hindered the sharing of information between the Allied powers that could have made the understanding and decryption of the codes easier had forces been fulling joined and cooperative. Being put in such a position left the Allies in a state where they were waiting for Germans to make mistakes either in transmission or the capture of Enigma keys or prisoners of war with knowledge of the machine's operation. It also could be argued that the Allies did not pay enough attention to the technologies importance until it was already being exploited to help the German war effort. All of these reasons together and with various degrees of debatable consequence best answer the outlined research question. The problems related to the Allies mastery of the Enigma technology were problematic and likely made the war effort slower, however, they were not sufficiently flawed that they kept the Allied forces from breaking the initial code and the random code in time to make use of the related intelligence on the battlefield.

The story of the Enigma machine should not be looked upon under the over simplified assumption that it was a great Allied victory where the contributors knew the importance of the technology, always used the information collected for strategic advantage and shared everything they knew with one another across political borders in a timely fashion. While the cracking of the code was a major victory, it was not an infallible effort where there were clear heros and villains. While such designations make for good stories, they do not make for strong historical analysis of actual elements that were part of the code encryption and decryption processes of the Second World War.


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